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NOTES
PROPRIETARY INTERESTS AND
PROPRIETARY ESTATES IN SPACE
One of the most intriguing matters considered by legal scholars is
the nature of the landowner's proprietary interests in the space above and
below the surface of his land.' The early writers usually adopted some
form of the maxim attributed to Coke: cujus est solum ejus est usque ad
coelum.2 While man's knowledge and industry confined his activities
to within a few feet of the surface, the matter was of solely academic
interest, and the maxim presented no practical difficulties. In the
twentieth century, however, it has become necessary to determine the
extent of the landowner's proprietary interests in space, particularly as
they affect the use of space for travel and communications. In the
future it will also be necessary to determine the nature of proprietary
estates in space, as a consequence of the development of condominium
ownership. Part I of this note examines the landowner's property in-
terests in space and develops a concept of land ownership. Part II
examines some of the significant conceptual problems presented by
condominium ownership and suggests practical solutions.
PROPRIETARY INTERESTS IN SPACE
In several cases decided before powered flight became common,
courts spoke of the landowner's privilege of exclusive possession of the
space above and below the surface of his land.' The privilege was not
seriously questioned by the courts until landowners began to bring actions
to enjoin air travel through superjacent space. The aviation cases have
uniformly held that there is no absolute privilege to exclude aviators
from space at the altitudes used for air travel.4 Those and other cases
have held, however, that the landowner has other proprietary interests
1. See 1 COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: A COMMENTARY UPON
LiTTLEToN 4a (1st American ed. 1853); BLACKSTONE, COM-MENTARIES ON THE LAW bk.
I, 225 (Gavit ed. 1941); PRESTON, ESTATES 8 (1820); REEVES, REAL PROPERTY 73-74
(1904) ; SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 456-57 (11th ed. 1957).
2. 1 COKE, op. cit. supra note 1, 4a. "Whose is the soil, his it is up to the heavens."
3. See, e.g., Butler v. Frontier Tel. Co., 186 N.Y. 486, 79 N.E. 716 (1906) ; Mur-
phy v. Bolger, 60 Vt. 723, 15 AtL. 365 (1888) ; Bowser v. McLean, 2 De G.F.&J. 415, 45
Eng. Rep. 682 (Ch. 1860).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) ; Hinman v. Pacific Air
Transp., 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936) ; Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass.
511, 170 N.E. 385 (1930).
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in space, including a privilege to appropriate it, an immunity from inter-
ference with the use and enjoyment of it after it is appropriated, and an
exclusive privilege to exploit it for commercial purposes. Although many
of the decisions on proprietary interests in space are expressed in terms
of "ownership," "possession," or "fee," rather than in terms of the
proprietary incident recognized,5 the courts have not arbitrarily applied
to space the incidents earlier recognized in the surface and subsoil.
Privilege to Appropriate Superjacent and Subjacent Space
The landowner's privilege to reduce superjacent and subjacent space
to use or possession has been recognized in several types of cases. Per-
haps the clearest recognition has been in those cases challenging the con-
stitutionality of municipal ordinances and state statutes limiting the
height of structures. According to the United States Supreme Court
these limitations on the landowner's future appropriation are valid only
if they are reasonably and substantially related to a legitimate concern of
government.6 Height restrictions having no apparent relation to health
and safety but having a public purpose have been held to constitute a
"taking" of property, for which just compensation must be paid.'
In several of the aviation cases the defendant has argued that the
landowner's property interests in superjacent space are limited by federal
statutes and regulations governing air commerce.8 These statutes and
regulations define "navigable airspace" in which a right of transit is
declared to exist and establish glidepaths and flight corridors for air-
craft.9  The courts have denied them proprietary significance and con-
5. See cases cited note 3 supra.
6. See Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
7. See Attorney General v. Williams, 174 Mass. 476, 55 N.E. 77 (1899).
8. See, e.g., Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) ; Swetland v. Curtiss
Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1932) ; Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore.
178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962).
9. In 1926 Congress acted to nationalize the regulation of air comnmerce, passing
the Air Commerce Act, ch. 344, 44 Stat. 568 (1926). That statute defined navigable air-
space as "airspace above the minimum safe altitudes of flight prescribed by the Secre-
tary of Commerce," ch. 344, § 10, 44 Stat. 574 (1926) (substantially re-enacted as Fed-
eral Aviation Act § 101(24), 72 Stat. 739 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1301(24) (1964)), and
provided that "such navigable airspace shall be subject to a public right of freedom of
interstate and foreign air navigation .... ." Ibid. (substantially re-enacted as Federal
Aviation Act § 104, 72 Stat. 740 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1304 (1964)). The Civil Aeronau-
tics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (1938) (substantially re-enacted as Federal Avia-
tion Act, 72 Stat. 731 (1958), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1964)), amended the Air Com-
merce Act. It empowered the newly-created Civil Aeronautics Authority to promote
safety of flight in air commerce by prescribing "air traffic rules . . . including rules
as to safe altitudes of flight," ch. 601, § 601(a), 52 Stat. 1007 (1938) (substantially re-
enacted as Federal Aviation Act § 307(c), 72 Stat. 750 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1348(c)
(1964)). It also "recognized and declared to exist in behalf of any citizen of the
United States a public right of freedom of transit in air commerce through the navig-
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strued them as mere regulations of air commerce."0 Congress apparently
agrees with the courts. Following the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Causby" that repeated overflights that interfere sub-
stantially with the enjoyment of land constitute the taking of an easement
of flight, Congress authorized the purchase of several types of easements
in superjacent space, including clearance or obstruction easements. 2
These easements prevent the landowner from erecting structures above
a defined plane.'8
The landowner's privilege to appropriate space has been recognized
as dominant in cases brought by landowners to prevent others from in-
terfering with the future appropriation of the space. In a few cases
encroachments have been held actionable although they were at altitudes
or depths not used by the plaintiff landowner and did not interfere with
his present use and enjoyment of the land.' The express or implicit
ground for relief in these cases has been that the encroachment interfered
with future appropriation.' 5 Stationary encroachments in superjacent
and subjacent space can interfere with the landowner's use of space
either by physically preventing his use of it or by establishing a prescrip-
tive easement in it. Prescriptive easements to maintain projections into
space above or below the surface of another's land can be acquired.'
Some courts have mentioned as a reason for relieving the landowner
from a stationary encroachment that an easement might arise by pre-
scription unless the encroachment were removed.'
able airspace of the United States," ch. 601, § 3, 52 Stat. 980 (1938) (now Federal Avia-
tion Act § 1104, 72 Stat. 740 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1304 (1964)).
10. See, e.g., Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 88 (1962); Swetland v.
Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201, 203 (6th Cir. 1932) ; Thornburg v. Port of Port-
land, 233 Ore. 178, 198, 376 P.2d 100, 109 (1962).
11. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
12. See, e.g., the National Airports Act of 1946, ch. 251, §§ 4, 13, 60 Stat. 172-73,
177 (1946), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1103(a), 1112(a) (1964).
13. Pursuant to these statutes the Government has condemned obstruction ease-
ments in land adjoining air bases to preserve approaches. See, e.g., United States v.
64.88 Acres of Land, 244 F.2d 534 (3d Cir. 1957) ; United States v. 48.10 Acres of Land,
144 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) ; United States v. 4.43 Acres of Land, 137 F. Supp.
567 (N.D. Tex. 1956).
14. See Smith v. City of Atlanta, 92 Ga. 119, 17 S.E. 981 (1893) ; Crocker v. Man-
hattan Life Ins. Co., 61 App. Div. 226, 70 N.Y.S. 492 (1901); Kelsen v. Imperial To-
bacco Co., [1957] 2 Q.B. 334; but see Harrington v. City of Port Huron, 86 Mich. 46,
48 N.W. 641 (1891).
15. See Smith v. City of Atlanta, 92 Ga. 119, 120, 17 S.E. 981 (1893) ; Crocker v.
Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 61 App. Div. 226, 230, 70 N.Y. Supp. 492, 495 (1901) ; Kelsen
v. Imperial Tobacco Co., [1957] 2 Q.B. 334.
16. See, e.g., Ariola v. Nigro, 16 Ill. 2d 46, 156 N.E.2d 536 (1959) ; Keats v. Hugo,
115 Mass. 204, 217 (1874) (by implication); Romans v. Nadler, 217 Minn. 174, 14
N.W.2d 482 (1944).
17. See, e.g., Norwalk Heating & Lighting Co. v. Vernam, 75 Conn. 662, 664, 55
Atl. 168 (1903) ; Goldstein v. Beal, 317 Mass. 750, 756, 59 N.E.2d 712, 716 (1945).
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The landowner's privilege to appropriate superjacent space is not
limited by aviators' prior use of the space in taking off and landing. The
landowner may erect a structure on his land that interferes with or even
prevents the operation of a nearby airport," unless the sole purpose of
the structure is to interfere with aviation. 9 It is not yet clear whether
repeated overflights can establish a prescriptive easement of way. The
Causby case2" and its progeny2' indicate that repeated overflights can
establish a prescriptive right to interfere with the peaceful enjoyment of
land. But the privilege of appropriating space and the immunity from
interference with the present use and enjoyment of land are distinguish-
able. Therefore the nature of the flights that might establish a prescrip-
tive easement of way is distinguishable from the nature of the flights that
can establish a prescriptive right to interfere with use and enjoyment.22
The former would have to be approximately consistent in location and
direction, and low enough to apprise the landowner that they were over
the surface of his land."3 The latter must simply constitute interference
with use and enjoyment but need not be consistent in location and direc-
tion. The few courts that have considered whether a prescriptive ease-
ment of way may be established have avoided deciding the issue.24
It may be that courts will rigorously apply the requirements for
prescriptive easements and find in each case that overflights, although
frequent and consistent in location and direction, do not establish a
sufficiently-defined path to create an easement of way. Such an ap-
proach would, however, be unnecessarily technical. If the flights are
sufficiently low, frequent, and consistent in direction and location to
apprise the landowner that there is an established airway over the surface
of his land, there is no reason, doctrinal or practical, for insisting that
18. See, e.g., Guith v. Consumers Power Co., 36 F. Supp. 21 (E.D. Mich. 1940) ;
Reaver v. Martin Theatres, 52 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 1951); Capital Airways, Inc. v. Indi-
anapolis Power & Light Co., 215 Ind. 462, 18 N.E.2d 776 (1939).
19. See, e.g., United Airports v. Hinman, 1940 U.S. Av. 1 (S.D. Cal. 1939);
Tucker v. City of Iowa City, 1936 U.S. Av. 10 (Dist. Ct. Johnson County, Tenn. 1935);
Commonwealth v. Von Besteeki, 30 Pa. D. & C. 137 (C.P. Dauphin County 1937).
20. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
21. E.g., Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); Wright v. United
States, 279 F.2d 517 (Ct. Claims 1960) ; Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178,
376 P.2d 100 (1962).
22. This distinction is made in the cases brought by the Government to condemn
obstruction easements for approaches to airbases. See cases cited note 13 szpra.
23. See the discussion of the requirements of prescriptive easement in 2 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 8.44, 8.53-8.58 (Casner ed. 1954). According to the editors of that
treatise "prescriptive rights are not obtainable by regular flights over another's land as
successive planes do not fly through the same air sector." 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROP-
ERTY § 28.4 n.24 (Casner ed. 1954).
24. See Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201, 203 (6th Cir. 1932);
Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 531, 170 N.E. 385, 393 (1930).
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the airway be precisely definable. The classic requirements of prescrip-
tive easements-adverseness, notoriety, and continuity2 -will probably
be satisfied in few cases since flights must be fairly low before the land-
owner can determine that they are over the surface of his land.
Immunity from Interference with Present Use and Enjoyment
Within the space he has appropriated by using or occupying it, the
landowner has an absolute immunity from intrusions. Physical intru-
sions into that space are actionable although they do not interfere with
the actual existing use of the land. In cases involving encroaching roofs,
eaves, utility poles, wires, foundations, or other structures, the mere fact
of encroachment has been sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to relief.2"
Although these encroachments are also actionable as interferences with
future actual appropriation of the space occupied by the projection, the
courts have not discussed future appropriation in their opinions, and
their decisions are explainable on the more basic ground that the land-
owner has an immunity from interference with his possession of space
within the limits of his appropriation. In effect, trespass quare clausum
fregit has been applied to space at the altitude and depth to which the
landowner uses his land.
Most of the aviation cases have been brought by landowners to
prevent continued interference with their enjoyment of their land by
flights in superjacent space beyond the occupied zone. Flights that
substantially and unreasonably interfere with the present use and enjoy-
ment of the land have uniformly been held to violate the landowner's
property rights.28 Where they are frequent and have a public purpose,
the flights have been held to constitute a taking of property for which
just compensation is due.28
25. See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 8.44, 8.53 (Casner ed. 1954).
26. See, e.g., Wachstein v. Christopher, 128 Ga. 229, 57 S.E. 511 (1907) (founda-
tion) ; Goldstein v. Beal, 317 Mass. 750, 59 N.E.2d 712 (1945) (fire escape) ; Wilmarth
v. Woodcock, 58 Mich. 482, 25 N.W. 475 (1885) (cornice) ; Butler v. Frontier Tel. Co.,
186 N.Y. 486, 79 N.E. 716 (1906) (telephone wire) ; Murphy v. Bolger, 60 Vt. 723, 15
Atl. 365 (1888) (roof); Keesling v. City of Seattle, 52 Wash. 2d 247, 324 P.2d 806
(1958) (utility pole crossarm).
27. According to the editors of the American Law of Property, speaking of the
landowner's immunity in superjacent space: "where his occupancy vests him with pos-
sessory rights to the invaded area, his recovery is in trespass; where he is not clothed
with such rights, or where he has suffered from continuous and repeated intrusions it is
in nuisance." 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 28.4 (Casner ed. 1954). The distinction
between the remedies pursued is not so clear-cut, as nuisance has been used in the oc-
cupied zone, and trespass has been used outside the occupied zone.
28. See, e.g., Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1932);
Brandes v. Mitterling, 67 Ariz. 349, 196 P.2d 464 (1948) ; Hyde v. Somerset Air Serv.,
1 NJ. Super. 346, 61 A.2d 645 (Ch. 1948).
29. See, e.g., Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v.
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Whatever the form of action pursued by the successful plaintiff-
landowner in the aviation cases, the basis of liability has been that of
nuisance: substantial and unreasonable interference with present use and
enjoyment. Since nuisance is the basis of liability, it should be irrelevant
whether the interference is caused by flights over the surface of plain-
tiff's land or by flights over the surface of a neighbor's land."0  However,
in some of the aviation cases the courts commingle trespass terminology
with nuisance terminology and hold that flights through superjacent
space are trespasses if they substantially and unreasonably interfere with
the use and enjoyment of the land."' Several courts have held that
interfering flights must be over the surface of the plaintiff's land to
constitute a taking under the Causby doctrine." These cases suggest
that the landowner has a greater immunity from nuisances originating
over the surface of his land, but beyond the occupied zone, than he has
from nuisances originating over the surface of another's land.
This suggestion of a greater immunity in superjacent space is il-
logical. The basis of the aviator's tort is his disruption of the land-
owner's present use and enjoyment, not his hypothetical interference
with the landowner's proprietary interests in unappropriated superjacent
space. Flights over the surface of a neighbor's land can be as disruptive
of the plaintiff's use and enjoyment as flights in his own superjacent
space. The Oregon Supreme Court has refused to make a distinction in
two recent cases 3 which have drawn favorable comment.3"
Privilege of Exclusive Commercial Exploitation of Space
Space can be used by intruders in many ways that are commercially
profitable but that do not violate the landowner's privilege to appropriate
it in the future or his immunity from interference with use and enjoy-
ment. The space above the earth is continually used by the aviation and
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) ; Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d
100 (1962).
30. See PROSSER, TORTS 592-603 (3d ed. 1964).
31. See, e.g., the language in Brandes v. Mitterling, 67 Ariz. 349, 355, 196 P.2d 464,
468 (1948), quoting Vanderslice v. Shawn, 26 Del. Ch. 225, 229, 27 A.2d 87, 90 (Ch.
1942): "whether in landing, taking off, or otherwise, flight over another's land, so low
as to interfere with the then existing use to which the land is put, is expressly outside
of the statutory definition of lawful flight; and being an unprivileged invasion of the
space above the land, such flight is a trespass." And see Anderson v. Souza, 38 Cal. 2d
825, 243 P.2d 497 (1952) ; Hyde v. Somerset Air Serv., 1 N.J. Super. 346, 61 A.2d 645
(Ch. 1948).
32. See, e.g., Freeman v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1958)
Moore v. United States, 185 F. Supp. 399 (N.D. Tex. 1960) ; Batten v. United States,
306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962).
33. Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962) ; Atkinson
v. Bernard, Inc., 223 Ore. 624, 355 P.2d 229 (1960).
34. See PROSSER, TORTS 68 (3d ed. 1964).
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communications industries, usually without interference with the existing
or prospective use of the land. This commercial exploitation of space
has never been held actionable. In a recent, unique case the Tennessee
Supreme Court denied an injunction against the transmission of micro-
wave signals over the plaintiff's land.3" The court noted: "it is common
knowledge that the air above the lands of the United States is constantly
traversed by countless numbers of radio signals and impulses. We are
confident that the sending of such signals has never been held an action-
able trespass or invasion of the rights of a landowner. No harm is done
nor interference with the use of the land created, no matter how low the
signals may pass or how frequently."36  In view of the vital significance
of communications in modern societies, the prohibitive cost of acquiring
communications easements, the apparent absence of damage to landowners
from transmissions in superjacent space, the absence of any precedent
for challenging such transmissions despite years of extensive use of the
airways, and the precedents of the aviation cases, it is inconceivable that
the landowner may exclude others from using superjacent space for the
transmission of communications. On similar reasoning, it is inconceiv-
able that the landowner may prevent other commercial uses of super-
jacent space unless they interfere with his present or future use of the
space.
In contrast to these limitations on the landowner's proprietary
interests in superjacent space he apparently may prevent others from
making commercial use of space beneath the surface. In a few cases
landowners have sought and obtained equitable relief from the unlicensed
commercial exploitation of natural or man-made cavities under the sur-
face of their land for tourism or mining." These intrusions typically
have not interfered with the plaintiff's present use of the land or with
his future appropriation of the space used by the intruder. Therefore
the granting of relief cannot be explained on the basis of the landowner's
immunity from interference with present enjoyment or on the basis of
his privilege to appropriate the space in the future, but must rest on a
more extensive right. A more extensive right might be that of exclusive
possession of subjacent space. However, since the underground cavity
cases all involve commercial exploitation, they could easily be distingu-
ished if a case arises involving a casual, noncommercial intrusion into
an underground cavity. They do not squarely hold that the landowner
35. Brannan v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 210 Tenn. 697, 362 S.W.2d 236 (1962).
36. Id. at 700-01, 362 S.W.2d at 237.
37. See Marengo Cave Co. v. Ross, 212 Ind. 624, 10 N.E.2d 917 (1937) ; Edwards
v. Lee's Adm'r., 265 Ky. 418, 96 S.W.2d 1028 (1936) ; Bowser v. McLean, 2 De G.F.&J.
415, 45 Eng. Rep. 682 (Ch. 1860) ; Phillips v. Homfray, L.R. 6 Ch. 770 (1871).
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has a privilege of exclusive possession in subjacent space.
If commercial exploitation is not the essence of the trespass in the
cave and mine cases, it is at least a practical precondition to the bringing
of an action and the significant requisite to the granting of meaningful
relief. The opinions in the cases indicate that commercial exploitation
is the essence of the trespass. The plaintiffs have argued that they alone
are entitled to profits attributable to the peculiar value or convenience of
space beneath the surface of their land." They have prayed for injunc-
tions against further intrusions and for accountings for the profits
allocable to the past use of the space."0 In granting relief the courts
appear to give primary weight to the commercial character of the in-
trusions."
Several factors explain the distinction between the landowner's
rights and privileges in superjacent space and those in subjacent space.
First, communications and air transportation are in the public interest,
and national defense would be impossible without a public right of free
transit and communication in superjacent space. There is seldom a public
interest in the use of subterranean space. Second, the subjacent en-
croachment cases have usually involved more than a mere use of space
for transit. In the cave cases, it is the beauty of the solid matter which
forms the cave, not the space itself, that is exploited.4 This exploitation
is more analogous to the extraction of valuable minerals than to the use
of space as a medium of movement. In the mine cases the defendants
have excavated new shafts and ways, constructed artificial support, and
drained water, gases, and waste into the plaintiff's subsoil.2 Third, the
mine cases, in which the right to exclude others from commercial use of
subjacent space was first recognized, have involved clandestine use of
the space with knowledge that the space is beneath the surface of plain-
tiff's land. While a landowner might not be aware that his land is
crossed by an airway or communication pathway, it is commonly known
that such channels cross private land. Furthermore, no moral disap-
probation attaches to this open use of space, as attaches to the secret
38. See Edwards v. Lee's Adm'r., 265 Ky. 418, 423, 96 S.W.2d 1028, 1030 (1936) ;
Bowser v. McLean, 2 De G.F.&J. 415, 417-18, 45 Eng. Rep. 682, 683 (Ch. 1860) ; Phillips
v. Homf ray, L.R. 6 Ch. 770, 771 (1871).
39. Ibid.
40. The courts indicated that they would award only nominal damages had the com-
mercial factor been absent. See, e.g., Edwards v. Lee's Adm'r., 265 Ky. 418, 423-29, 96
S.W.2d 1028, 1030-33 (1936) ; Bowser v. McLean, 2 De G.F.&J. 415, 421, 45 Eng. Rep.
682, 684 (Ch. 1860).
41. See Marengo Cave Co. v. Ross, 212 Ind. 624, 10 N.E.2d 917 (1937) ; Edwards
v. Lee's Adm'r., 265 Ky. 418, 96 S.W.2d 1028 (1936).
42. See Bowser v. McLean, 2 De G.F.&J. 415, 45 Eng. Rep. 682 (Ch. 1860); Phil-
lips v. Homf ray, L.R. 6 Ch. 770 (1871).
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use of an underground cavity.
Practical and Conceptual Problems in Selecting a Form of Action for
Violations of Proprietary Interests in Space
A variety of forms of action have been used to protect property
interests in space. Although the relief in practically all cases has been
the removal or termination of the intrusion, the form of action used has
practical and conceptual significance which the courts have ignored.4"
In adopting a theory about the remedial rights of a landowner against an
intruder, a court is necessarily adopting a theory about the substantive
status of both parties. And obviously some forms of action lack the
conceptual elasticity to give relief from all violations of property inter-
ests in space.
Nuisance has been the form of action in a few cases." By holding
that an intrusion in superjacent or subjacent space is a nuisance, a court
implicitly recognizes that the intrusion violates the plaintiff's proprietary
interests in the land where enjoyment is disturbed, but implies nothing
about his proprietary interests in the space where the intrusion occurs.
In nuisance theory the geographic origin of the interference is irrelevant.45
Because of its conceptual limitations nuisance has limited utility in
protecting property interests in space. It is an appropriate form of
action for an intrusion in space that interferes with the present use and
enjoyment of land. But it is not adequate to protect the landowner from
an intrusion that interferes only with his future appropriation of space
or an intrusion that only exploits the commercial value of subterranean
cavities.
Ejectment has also been used in a few cases.46 By applying it to an
intrusion in space, a court implicitly recognizes that the intrusion has
ousted the plaintiff landowner from former possession of some portion
of his land and that the intruder has entered into possession of that por-
43. The courts of New York and Wisconsin have considered the significance of
the form of action; see Aiken v. Benedict, 39 Barb. 400 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1863), overruled
in Butler v. Frontier Tel. Co., 186 N.Y. 486, 79 N.E. 716 (1906); Rasch v. Noth, 99
Wis. 285, 74 N.W. 820 (1898).
44. See, e.g., Meyer v. Metzler, 51 Cal. 142 (1875) ; Wilmarth v. Woodcock, 58
Mich. 482, 25 N.W. 475 (1885) ; Fay v. Prentice, 1 C.B. 828, 135 Eng. Rep. 769 (1845)
(all involving stationary encroachments) ; Anderson v. Souza, 38 Cal. 2d 825, 243 P.2d
497 (1952) ; Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962) ; Atkin-
son v. Bernard, Inc., 223 Ore. 624, 355 P.2d 229 (1960) (all involving aviation intru-
sions).
45. PROSSER, TORTS 592-603 (3d ed. 1964).
46. See, e.g., Wachstein v. Christopher, 128 Ga. 229, 57 S.E. 511 (1907) ; Butler v.
Frontier Tel. Co., 186 N.Y. 486, 79 N.E. 716 (1906); Murphy v. Bolger, 60 Vt. 723, 15
AtI. 365 (1888).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
tion. 47  By operation of the statute of limitations the intruder's status as
a possessor would give him title to some portion of space if the doctrine
of adverse possession were satisfied. In at least one case a court has
suggested that an encroachment in superjacent space that satisfies the
technical requirements of the doctrine will give title to some quantum of
space.48 It is unclear, however, whether the court conceived that adverse
possession would give title to only the portion of airspace actually oc-
cupied or to a greater portion of the column of space and matter inter-
cepted by the encroachment.4" In most of the ejectment cases the courts
have considered the intrusion an ouster from possession of only the space
actually occupied by the encroachment,"0 and several courts have denied
ejectment on the ground that an intrusion in superjacent or subjacent
space is not an ouster unless it precludes the landowner's possession of the
surface.5 The rationale of the latter cases is apparently that possession
of the surface is constructive possession of the space above and below
or that an encroachment in space is not an ouster from possession unless
it interferes with the use of the surface.
As with nuisance, the conceptual limitations of ejectment limit its
practical utility. It might be used to remedy all stationary encroachments
and those transitory intrusions that prevent the landowner's use and oc-
cupancy of space. However, many transitory intrusions in space that
violate the landowner's property interests cannot be treated as ousters
from possession, and ejectment is therefore an inappropriate form of
action to remedy them.
The most frequently used form of action has been trespass.5 2 Tres-
47. See SHIPMAN, CO-MmoN-LAw PLEADING 173-80 (3d ed. 1923).
48. XVilmarth v. Woodcock, 58 Mich. 482, 485, 25 N.W. 475, 476 (1885).
49. For a discussion of this question see Romans v. Nadler, 217 Minn. 174, 14
N.W.2d 482 (1944) ; Ball, The Vertical Extent of Ownership in Land, 76 U. PA. L. REv.
631, 663-65 (1928).
50. See, e.g., Wachstein v. Christopher, 128 Ga. 229, 231, 57 S.E. 511, 512 (1907)
Butler v. Frontier Tel. Co., 186 N.Y. 486, 491-92, 79 N.E. 716, 718 (1906) ; Murphy v.
Bolger, 60 Vt. 723, 727-28, 15 AtI. 365, 367-68 (1888).
51. See, e.g., Norwalk Heating & Lighting Co. v. Vernam, 75 Conn. 662, 55 Atl.
168 (1903); Rasch v. Noth, 99 Wis. 285, 74 N.W. 820 (1898); Zander v. Valentine
Blatz Brewing Co., 95 Wis. 162, 70 N.W. 164 (1897). It is interesting to trace the
evolution of the Wisconsin doctrine from the unusual opinion in McCourt v. Eckstein,
22 Wis. 148 (1867), to the summary statement in Beck v. Ashland Cigar & Tobacco
Co., 146 Wis. 324, 327, 130 N.W. 464, 465-66 (1911): "the doctrine is therefore firmly
intrenched in this state that when there is an intrusion into the premises of another
either below or above ground, but he is undisturbed in his possession of the surface of
his land up to the true line, his remedy is trespass and not ejectment, and, if the tres-
pass is a continuing one, equity has jurisdiction thereof."
52. See, e.g., Keesling v. City of Seattle, 52 Wash. 2d 247, 324 P.2d 806 (1958);
Goldstein v. Beal, 317 Mass. 750, 59 N.E.2d 712 (1945); Kelsen v. Imperial Tobacco
Co., [1957] 2 Q.B. 334 (all involving stationary encroachments in superjacent space);
Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 526, 170 N.E. 385, 391 (1930);
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pass is usually defined as interference with possession." A mere techni-
cal intrusion into superjacent space is not enough; there must be inter-
ference with one of the rights, privileges, or immunities of ownership.54
By applying trespass a court implicitly recognizes that the landowner has
a "possessory" interest in the space where the intrusion occurred, but
avoids the substantive, doctrinal consequences of ejectment. Since a
continuing trespass can be enjoined,55 the relief available on a trespass
theory is as complete as the relief afforded by ejectment.
A continuing trespass, if it is notorious and maintained for the re-
quisite length of time, establishes a prescriptive easement." There are
sound policy reasons for favoring this substantive result over the sub-
stantive correlate of ejectment. First, the location of an easement on
the servient tenement need not be as precisely defined as the location of
a fee acquired by adverse possession. If the intruder acquires a prescrip-
tive easement to maintain a projection, his easement is not necessarily
confined to the space occupied by the projection that originally created
the easement, nor is the owner of the servient tenement perpetually pre-
cluded from occupying that space. If the intruder acquires title to the
space by adverse possession, the space must be defined and described.
The present complexities of titles would be compounded if it were neces-
sary to define and describe three-dimensional tracts of space, and boun-
daries in space would be difficult to observe.
Second, the acquisition of a prescriptive easement does not completely
terminate the rights, privileges, powers, and immunities of the fee owner
in the space to which the easement relates. A fee owner may exercise
dominion over land subject to an easement to the extent that he does not
interfere with the easement."8 Treating the interest acquired by passage
of time as a prescriptive easement therefore permits the fullest consistent
use of the space by the fee owner and the intruder. In contrast, applying
the doctrine of adverse possession to intrusions in space might limit the
use of the space occupied and the use of the land above and below it. The
public policy favoring efficient land use is promoted by treating space in-
Brandes v. Mitterling, 67 Ariz. 349, 196 P.2d 464 (1948) ; Hyde v. Somerset Air Serv.,
1 N.J. Super. 346, 61 A.2d 645 (Ch. 1948) (all involving aviation intrusions).
53. See SHIPMAN, CoMMo,-LAW PLEADING 68, 77-78 (3d ed. 1923); PROSSER,
ToRTs 63-69 (3d ed. 1964).
54. In Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385 (1930),
and Hinman v. Pacific Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936), the plaintiffs failed
to prove the challenged flights interfered with their use and enjoyment, and relief was
denied.
55. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 28.17 (Casner ed. 1954).
56. 2 Id. §§ 8.44, 8.53.
57. 2 Id. § 8.66.
58. Ibid.
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trusions as mere trespasses.
Third, an easement may be terminated by operation of law, restoring
the fee to the undiminished extent it had before the easement arose.59 In
contrast, adverse possession severs title to the space adversely possessed
from title to the tract of which it formerly was a part. The ousted owner
retains no proprietary interest in the space, and title to the two tracts can
be reunited only by conveyance, devise, or inheritance. Where the intru-
sion is a projecting roof, eave, or foundation, the acquired interest is un-
likely to be used or asserted after the projection is destroyed or removed.
If the acquired interest is treated as an easement, it can terminate by
abandonment."0 However, if the interest is treated as fee title, it cannot
be terminated by abandonment;1 the space will lie unused, and the out-
standing fee will interfere with the development of the tract from which
the acquired interest was carved.
At least in superjacent space, the object that the doctrine of adverse
possession is said to serve-quieting men's titles02-is best served by
treating the interest acquired by long use as an easement, which can ter-
minate by abandonment. The difficulties of defining and observing
boundaries to an irregularly shaped, three dimensional tract of space ac-
quired by adverse possession would exceed the difficulties in determin-
ing the extent and location of an easement. The former difficulties
would be perpetual, whereas the latter difficulties would end when the
easement were abandoned or otherwise terminated.
Considered from the practical viewpoint, trespass has the advantage
that it is a sufficiently broad and flexible form of action to remedy vio-
lations of any proprietary rights, privileges, and immunities in space, at
least if those violations originate above or below the surface of the plain-
tiff's land. An injunction against a continuing trespess is a remedy as
complete as abatement or ejectment. The adoption of a single form of
action for all violations of proprietary interests in space would reduce the
hazard of dismissal for pursuing the wrong form of action and eliminate
59. 2 Id. §§ 8.87-8.104.
60. 2 Id. §§ 8.96, 8.97.
61. "The ability possessed by an owner of an easement to abandon his easement is
in contrast with the lack of such ability on the part of the owner of a possessory interest
in land. The ownership of a possessory interest can be lost only through its transfer to
another person. Perhaps the chief reason for this rule is that if an abandonment of a
possessory interest were permitted, there would be a vacancy in the ownership which
might result in a disorderly scramble in the attempt to establish a new ownership. In
the case of the easement, on the other hand, its abandonment results in the removal of
an encumbrance on an existing ownership." 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.98 (Cas-
ner ed. 1954).
62. See 3 id. §§ 15.1, 15.2.
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the necessity for pleading and proving former possession and ouster in
ejectment cases.
Conclusion: The Vertical Extent of Land
In denying the landowner's privilege of exclusive possession in su-
perjacent space, the courts have found it necessary to reject Coke's ancient
maxim that the owner of the soil owns from the center of the earth to the
heavens.6" And in recognizing the landowner's proprietary interests in
superjacent space they have found it necessary to theorize that he owns
some zone of space adjacent to the surface.64 The rejection of the maxim
and the formulation of the zone theory seem to rest on the premise that
superjacent space cannot be owned if it cannot be exclusively possessed-
that the privilege of exclusive possession is so essential to ownership that
the rejection of the former is the denial of the latter.
The premise and the zone theory do not accurately reflect the law on
proprietary interests in space. No appellate decision has yet placed a ceil-
ing on the landowner's privilege to appropriate superjacent space. The
common law recognized none, and the federal constitution contains none.
Statutes expressly or implicitly limiting the privilege have been denied
effect except as exercises of the state police power.65 In fact the only
limits on the landowner's appropriation of space are technological rather
than legal.
The premise and the zone theory are illogical because artificial boun-
daries in space are unnecessary to reconcile the rights of landowners and
aviators. Protection of the aviator's privilege to fly through unoccupied
space does not require that the landowner's privilege to appropriate be
limited to a "lower" zone. Protection of the landowner's property in-
terests in space does not require that the aviator be restricted to an "up-
per" zone. The altitude below which aviation becomes actionable de-
pends upon the type of aircraft used and the nature of the use made of
the land. The rigid zone concept, if the courts were to apply it, would
be an inept standard for protecting the landowner's use and enjoyment.
Coke's maxim is not an inaccurate statement of the landowner's
property interest in space if land is conceived of as the physical-spatial
63. See, e.g., Hinman v. Pacific Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755, 757 (9th Cir. 1936) ;
Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 41 F.2d 929, 938 (N.D. Ohio 1930) ; Smith v. New
England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 522, 170 N.E. 385, 390 (1930) ; 4 AMERICAN LAW
OF PROPERTY § 20.4 (Casner ed. 1954).
64. "The landowner owns at least as much of the space above the ground as he can
occupy or use in connection with the land." United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 274
(1946). See also Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201, 203 (6th Cir. 1932);
Hyde v. Somerset Air Serv., 1 N.J. Super. 346, 350, 61 A.2d 645, 647 (Ch. 1948).
65. See notes 6, 7, & 10 supra and accompanying text.
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dimension which is owned,66 and if ownership is conceived of as a com-
plex of rights, privileges, powers, and immunities having flexible appli-
cation to the land. Despite dicta to the contrary,67 it is these concepts of
land and ownership that the courts have been applying in adjudicating
rights in space. The landowner's privilege to appropriate space in the
future has been held superior to the interests of the state," the aviator,"
and the casual encroacher.7" And in recognition of the peculiar charac-
teristics of space, the incidents of ownership have been applied selectively.
The concept that land includes superjacent and subjacent space and
that the incidents of ownership apply to space less absolutely than they
apply to the surface and subsoil is not revolutionary. It is simply a realis-
tic and accurate expression of the landowner's proprietary interests in
space. Becaues it is a more accurate expression than the concepts pres-
ently being applied by courts, its adoption might diminish the confusion
over rights in space.
II PROPRIETARY ESTATES IN SPACE
The concept of a freehold estate in space is not new in Anglo-
American law. Cases involving estates in cellars, rooms, and stories of
buildings appear in the earliest English law reports"' and in nineteenth
century and early twentieth century American law reports. 2 In most of
the cases the possibility of creating such a freehold or acquiring one by
adverse possession was not seriously questioned; the matters litigated
were the nature of the interest and the extent of appurtenant rights.
Few of the courts considered whether the interest were one in the physical
parts of the building or one in the space enclosed by the building, and
66. "It is submitted that there can be no logical escape from a recognition that the
jural concept of land can be described only in terms applicable to relative three-dimen-
sional space, or, to phrase it another way, the concept of land has as its substate three-
dimensional space. A piece of land must be defined by planes which have as loci the
bounds marked out on the surface, and the center of the earth." Ball, The Jural Nature
of Land, 23 ILL. L. REv. 45, 62 (1928).
67. See cases cited notes 63 & 64 supra.
68. See notes 6, 7, 10, & 29 supra and accompanying text.
69. See notes 18 & 28 supra and accompanying text.
70. See notes 14 & 26 supra and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., Freeland v. Burt, 1 T.R. 701, 99 Eng. Rep. 1330 (K.B. 1787) ; Ford
v. Lerke, Noy 109, 74 Eng. Rep. 1074 (K.B. 1604).
72. See, e.g., Thompson v. McKay, 41 Cal. 221 (1871); Anderson School Town-
ship v. Milroy Lodge, 130 Ind. 108, 29 N.E. 411 (1891) ; Badger Lumber Co. v. Stepp,
157 Mo. 366, 57 S.W. 1059 (1900).
73. See, e.g., Anderson School Township v. Milroy Lodge, 130 Ind. 108, 29 N.E.
411 (1891) (availability of partition) ; Weaver v. Osborne, 154 Iowa 10, 134 N.W. 103
(1912) (duration of the estate); Badger Lumber Co. v. Stepp, 157 Mo. 366, 57 S.V.
1059 (1900) (enforcement of materialman's lien on building) ; Ford v. Lerke, Noy 109,
74 Eng. Rep. 1074 (1604) (right to exclusive possession).
74. See Thorn v. Wilson, 110 Ind. 325, 11 N.E. 230 (1887) ; Hahn v. Baker Lodge,
21 Ore. 30, 27 Pac. 166 (1891) ; Townes v. Cox, 162 Tenn. 624, 39 S.W.2d 749 (1931).
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few courts considered whether the estate survived the destruction of the
building."5 The value of the cases is that they illustrate the problems
encountered in creating freehold estates in space and suggest solutions to
these problems.
One consequence of the shift from an agricultural to an industrial
economy is that space has become more valuable than soil or minerals, at
least in urban areas. Increasingly, the primary object of land ownership
is the use of space for living and conducting business. In recent years
some of the superjacent space in American cities has been subdivided.
Railroads have sold the unused space above their tracks for the construc-
tion of office and commercial buildings."6 Cities have vacated the un-
used space above their streets for the erection of buildings."' Nearly all
of the states have enacted statutes authorizing condominium develop-
ment,7 and developers have built condominium apartments in most major
cities." The extensive creation of freeholds in space will probably pro-
duce numerous legal disputes over the nature of these estates.
The three most fundamental legal problems in creating and charac-
terizing freeholds in space are: providing for support for the occupation
of the space fee; determining the duration of the freehold and the effect
of the loss of support rights; and fixing the location of the space fee in
the land. The condominium statutes, declarations, and deeds contain de-
tailed provisions for support and access,"0 and elaborate provisions for
reconstruction of destroyed buildings and for termination of the condo-
minium regime.8" These provisions are designed to avoid problems of
support, access, and duration. The avoidance, however, is not complete,
and many of the provisions raise additional problems.
75. See Weaver v. Osborne, 154 Iowa 10, 134 NAV. 103 (1912) ; Jackson v. Bruns,
129 Iowa 616, 106 N.W. 1 (1906) (by implication); Hahn v. Baker Lodge, 21 Ore. 30,
27 Pac. 166 (1891).
76. See Ball, Division into Horizontal Strata of the Landscape Above the Surface,
39 YALE L.J. 616, 652-55 (1929-1930).
77. See Crawford, Some Legal Aspects of Air Rights and Land Use, 25 FED. B.J.
167, 175 (1965). An early example is Taft v. Washington Mutual Savings Bank, 127
Wash. 503, 221 Pac. 604 (1923).
78. By 1965, 42 states had enacted condominium enabling statutes. Harrison,
The FHA Condominium, 11 N.Y.L.F. 458 (1965).
79. The response to the enabling statutes and to FHA financing provisions has
been less than expected. See ibid.
80. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1353(c) (Cum. Supp. 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. §§
56-1202(f),-1207(d) (Burns 1966 Supp.); N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAw §§ 339-e(3),-i(4)
(McKinney 1966 Supp.).
81. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1355(b) (9), (f) (Cum. Supp. 1966); IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 56-1212(f), -1219, -1221, -1228 (Burns 1966 Supp.); N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW
§§ 339-t, -cc (McKinney 1966 Supp.).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
The Problem of Support
At the present time the ability to appropriate and possess space de-
pends on the existence of artificial support. If the owner of an estate in
superjacent space has rights to artificial support, he may appropriate and
use the space as effectively as he could if his land included the surface
and subsoil. It is irrelevant that the means of support are not within the
direct control of the space-owner since he has an enforceable right to
support. There is, of course, a relationship between the strength and
quality of the support and the use that can be made of the space. If sup-
port provisions are carelessly drafted the rights and duties of the parties
might be uncertain and the use of the space tract, the lower tract, or both
might be limited.
Support provisions might take the form of an affirmative easement
allowing the space-owner to construct support in the underlying land of
his grantor8" or the form of a covenant by the grantor to furnish support
for the appropriation of the space tract.83 Each form has peculiar ad-
vantages and disadvantages for the parties.
An affirmative easement to construct support in underlying land is
the most favorable to the space-owner. Subject to restrictions, it permits
him to use the subsoil for the support of his structure almost as freely as
if he owned the subsoil. He can modify the support as necessary to ac-
commodate the changing use of his fee. Since the use of the lower tract
can be seriously limited by the support constructed for the space tract,
the deed provision creating the easement should contain restrictions on
the character and location of the support that may be built in the lower
tract. This form of support right is best-suited for space tracts over
railroad tracks, streets, or highways, since support can be designed such
that it does not interfere with the passage of vehicles.
A covenant to furnish support to the space tract places the burden of
acting on the owner of the lower tract. Therefore the space-owner might
have to rely more on judicial proceedings than he would if his support
right were an easement to enter the lower tract and build the necessary
support. Depending on its provisions, a covenant can impose an onerous
burden on the estate in the lower tract or make the use and occupation of
the space tract largely dependent on the will of the covenantor. The ef-
fective utilization of superjacent space that is divided into two or more
tracts by horizontal planes requires effective cooperation between the
82. An affirmative easement entitles the easement owner to interfere with the
possession of the servient tenement. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.11 (Casner ed.
1954). See Ball, Dision into Horizontal Strata of the Landscape Above the Surface,
39 YALE L.J. 616, 652-55 (1929-1930).
83. On covenants, see 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 9.8-9.23 (Casner ed. 1954).
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owners of all tracts. To secure effective cooperation the covenant
should provide for: 1) the amount of support to be furnished and the
amount of weight to be borne, 2) the time and procedure for the demoli-
tion and construction of structures, and 3) the maintenance, repair, and
replacement of support. These provisions should be flexible enough to
permit the owners to respond to changing land uses, construction tech-
niques, and building designs. Yet they should be definite enough to pre-
vent either deadlock or uncertainty over rights and duties of support.
If no express provision for support is made, the conveyance of an
upper room or story in a building creates by implication an easement to
have existing support retained.8" However, no duties to provide per-
petual support or maintain existing support can arise by implication.85
An implied easement in existing support restricts the use of both the
space tract and the lower tract so long as the building stands. After the
existing support is destroyed, the owner of the space tract cannot appro-
priate his fee unless he obtains new support rights.
The creation of fees in superjacent space facilitates the efficient use
of that space only if there are support provisions that require effective
cooperation between the owners of upper and lower tracts and that per-
mit those owners to adapt the use of their fees to economic and techno-
logical progress. Inflexible support provisions that prevent the efficient
use of superjacent space are not in the public interest. Where support
provisions are inflexible an estate in space is little more than a limitation
on the surface owner's privilege to appropriate the space since neither he
nor the space owner can use the space. Legislatures and courts could for-
bid the creation of estates in space without adequate support provisions
on grounds of public policy. They probably will not do so since the law
frequently permits the creation of property interests in land that limit
the fee owner's dominion and interfere with the efficient development of
the land. For example, the law permits the subdivision of the surface
into lots that are too small to support high-rise structures. The subdivi-
sion of superjacent space into two or more strata is no more pernicious
in its effects than the subdivision of land into columns of space and sub-
soil and no more pernicious in its effects than other methods of fraction-
ing the incidents of ownership.
There are, however, two situations in which courts should qualify a
conveyance of superjacent space without adequate support rights in the
interest of efficient land use. First, where space is conveyed with no
84. McConnel v. Kibbe, 33 Ill. 175 (1864); Jackson v. Bruns, 129 Iowa 616, 106
N.W. 1 (1906) (dicta). Cf. Pierce v. Dyer, 109 Mass. 374 (1872).
85. Jackson v. Bruns, 129 Iowa 616, 106 N.W. 1 (1906). Cf. Pierce v. Dyer, 109
Mass. 374 (1872).
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mention of support and it appears that the parties intended to create an
interest in the nature of an easement of air, light, view, or flight rather
than a fee in the space, a court should construe the deed as creating an
easement. An easement can block development of land as effectively as
can a fee simple without support rights, but it is more destructible than
a fee simple: it can expire by its implied terms or terminate by operation
of law." Treating the interest created as an easement allows it to ter-
minate when the reason for its creation ceases to exist; treating it as a fee
simple causes it to linger after its purpose is gone. 7
Second, where space in an existing building is conveyed without ex-
press provision for support or where a space tract is conveyed with ex-
press provision for temporary support, a court should construe the deed
as creating an estate that terminates when support rights expire."8 This
construction would probably do little violence to the intent of the parties
since their omission of provisions for perpetual support would indicate
that they intended only temporary occupation and use of the space tract
by the grantee. It seems reasonable to infer that if the parties intended
to create a permanent estate they would have provided for perpetual
support.
The Problem of Duration
A few cases have treated estates in the upper portions of buildings
as defeasible estates if there are no rights to perpetual support.8 9 This
has been done although the deeds creating the estates have not used the
technical forms of the fee simple determinable.9" The courts have not
86. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 8.87-8.104 (Casner ed. 1954).
87. See supra pp.
88. See infra pp.
89. See Weaver v. Osborne, 154 Iowa 10, 134 N.W. 103 (1912) (dicta) ; Jackson
v. Bruns, 129 Iowa 616, 106 N.W. 1 (1906) (by implication) ; Hahn v. Baker Lodge, 21
Ore. 30, 27 Pac. 166 (1891); Townes v. Cox, 162 Tenn. 624, 39 S.W.2d 749 (1931)
(dicta).
90. The courts have not said that the defeasible estate in space is a fee simple
determinable. By saying that the interest is one in portions of a building rather than
one in land they have avoided the problems of calling the interest a fee simple determin-
able. One of these problems is whether the Statute of Frauds permits a court to construe
a deed conveying an estate in space as conveying a fee simple determinable in the ab-
sence of the technical language of fee simple determinable. Such a construction does
not violate the Statute of Frauds since the intent of the parties to create a defeasible
fee can be inferred from the deed language describing the fee as a room, apartment, or
space tract and from the absence of language creating rights to perpetual support. The
words of limitation that create a fee simple determinable can be implied from this
language or absence of language.
Another problem is whether construing the interest as a fee simple determinable
will result in reunion of title to the space tract and title to the lower tract in those
states which treat the possibility of reverter as an inalienable interest. In most states
the possibility of reverter is alienable. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.70 (Casner
ed. 1954). Unless the grantor of the space tract can convey his possibility of reverter
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rested their deed construction on public policy, but on the inferred intent
of the parties to create an interest that would last no longer than the
room or story conveyed lasted. Where the deeds have contained express
provision for support, the courts have inferred that a permanent non-
defeasible estate was intended.9 Some of the courts have distinguished
between an interest in a "room" or "story," which they have considered
terminable on the destruction of the building, and an interest in the
"land," which they have considered capable of surviving destruction of
the building. 2 The correct distinction, made by at least one court, is the
one between an interest in land that terminates on destruction of an ex-
isting structure, and an interest in land that survives the destruction of
an existing structure.93 The conveyance of a room or story obviously
creates an estate in the land: the privilege of possessing and using the
space occupied and the right to have the building left where it is. It is
inconceivable that the interest acquired by such a conveyance is not an
interest in land. If it were an interest in personalty, the object of owner-
ship could be moved from the land, and the grantee would have no right
to keep it on the land.94
The duration problem has been a perplexing one for those attempt-
ing to formulate a workable concept of condominium ownership.9" Con-
dominium development is an effort to make available to more urban resi-
dents and business organizations the advantages of fee ownership. One
of the primary advantages condominium is designed to provide is the
permanence of a fee estate. The condominium fee consists of a fee in
severalty in the space occupied by an apartment96 and a fee in common
to successors in title to the lower tract, upon termination of the fee simple determinable
title to the space tract will vest in the grantor rather than the owner of the lower tract.
In the interest of public policy the courts should treat such possibilities of reverter as
alienable interests.
91. See Weaver v. Osborne, 154 Iowa 10, 134 N.W. 103 (1912); Hahn v. Baker
Lodge, 21 Ore. 30, 27 Pac. 166 (1891) (dicta) ; Pearson v. Matheson, 102 S.C. 377, 86
S.E. 1063 (1915).
92. See, e.g., Thorn v. Wilson, 110 Ind. 325, 11 N.E. 230 (1887) ; Weaver v. Os-
borne, 154 Iowa 10, 134 N.W. 103 (1912); Hahn v. Baker Lodge, 21 Ore. 30, 27 Pac.
166 (1891).
93. Townes v. Cox, 162 Tenn. 624, 39 S.W.2d 749 (1931).
94. See Madison v. Madison, 206 Ill. 534, 69 N.E. 625, 627 (1903) : "in determin-
ing the character or kind of property, we must take into consideration all the facts and
circumstances surrounding the transaction, the intention of the parties, the size and kind
of building, the manner in which it is attached to the realty, and whether or not it can
be removed without injury to the fee." The court held that second and third stories of
a building were realty.
95. See, e.g., Cribbet, Condomiizhon--Home Ozwnership for Megalopolis?, 61 MIcH[.
L. REV. 1207, 1212 (1963) ; Gregory, The California Condominium Bill, 14 HAsTINGs L.J.
189, 192 (1962-1963) ; Comment, Community Apartments: Condomilnium or Stock Co-
operative?, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 299, 301-04 (1962).
96. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 56-1202(a), -1205 (Burns 1966 Supp.) ; N.J.S.A.
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with the other project tenants in those portions of the land and building
not owned in severalty.9" The condominium estate includes rights to sup-
port, access, and maintenance burdening the tenancy in common.9" So
long as the land remains under condominium regime99 partition does not
lie.100
The permanence that is one of the primary attractions of condo-
minium is also one of its primary disadvantages from both a social and
a proprietary standpoint. If condominium ownership were in fee simple
absolute, any single owner could prevent the release of the land from
condominium regime and the use of the land for more desirable and eco-
nomical purposes. He could require the other owners to maintain the
building after it became obsolete or deteriorated, and he could compel
them to furnish new support and access after destruction of the building.
Because condominium fees are highly interdependent, a single owner
,could seriously restrict the freedom of the other owners to dispose of
their land and could substantially control the use of far more land than
he owns. Condominium might further the blight of urban neighbor-
hoods by preventing desirable changes in land use. And it might finan-
cially entrap the buyer by severely limiting the market for his land.
To prevent a single owner or group of owners from blocking the
termination of the condominium regime when it is necessary or desirable
to terminate it, the enabling statutes, project declarations, and condo-
minium deeds typically provide for automatic termination when a certain
percentage of the owners agree to terminate'.' or when the building is
wholly or substantially destroyed and less than a certain percentage of the
46:8A-2(a) (Cum. Supp. 1966); TEx. REv. STAT. tit. 31, art. 1301(a), § 2(e) (Cum.
Supp. 1966).
97. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1350(4), 1353(b) (Cum. Supp. 1966); IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 56-1202(f), -1207 (Burns 1966 Supp.) ; N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW §§ 339-e(3),
(5), 339-i(1) (McKinney 1966 Supp.).
98. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1353(c) (Cum. Supp. 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. §§
56-1202(f), -1207(d) (Burns 1966 Supp.); N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW §§ 339-e(3),
-i(4) (McKinney 1966 Supp.).
99. Condominium regime is the system of rights, privileges, powers, immunities,
duties, obligations, and disabilities that governs the property relationship between the
condominium owners. Condominium subdivision is the plan that divides the land into
fees in severalty; it necessarily corresponds with the plan that divides the building into
apartments.
100. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1354 (Cum. Supp. 1966) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-
1307(c) (Burns 1966 Supp.); N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 339-i(3) (McKinney 1966
Supp.).
101. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1355 (b) (9) (Cum. Supp. 1966) ; ILL. REV. STAT.
§ 30-315 (Smith-Hurd 1966 Supp.); N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 339-t (McKinney 1966
Supp.).
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owners agree to rebuild." 2 Termination of the rigime leaves the con-
dominium land owned in common by the tenants, and partition lies.
10 3
Therefore, only the fee in severalty in space occupied by an apartment is
terminated.
Several forms of termination provisions might be used. First, in
those states that treat the possibility of reverter as an alienable interest,
the conveyance of each apartment might be in fee simple determinable
with a specified majority vote of the tenants as the terminating event. 0
The possibilities of reverter in all the apartments in the project would be
held by the owners as tenants in common. Second, each deed might con-
tain a covenant by the grantee to convey the fee to the teancy in common
if a specified percentage of the owners vote to terminate the regime. The
covenant would run to all the owners as tenants in common. Third, the
enabling statute might provide that when the necessary percentage of
owners agree to terminate, all owners must convey their fees to the ten-
ancy in common.' Fourth, the enabling statute might provide that
when the necessary agreement is reached the condominium regime auto-
matically converts to tenancy in common. 00
Each of the termination provisions suggested presents unique legal
problems. All of them, however, raise a fundamental question: is the
condominium owner's estate a fee if others have a right to terminate it at
will and vest ownership in themselves? One of the essential qualities of
a fee estate is that it can continue forever." 7 That an estate may not
continue forever does not, however, prevent its being a fee.' The tra-
ditional estate in a room or story of a building or in superjacent space is
102. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1355(f) (Cum. Supp. 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. §§
56-1219, -1221 (Burns 1966 Supp.); N.Y. RIEAL PROPERTY LAW § 339-cc (McKinney
1966 Supp.).
103. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 752(b), 1354 (Cum. Supp. 1966); IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 56-1221, -1228(b) (Burns 1966 Supp.); N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW §§ 339-t,
-cc (McKinney 1966 Supp.).
104. "The mechanism commonly used in California is to grant to each owner a
fee in his unit which determines when the property is destroyed in whole or in part and
when a specified majority of owners elect not to rebuild. Interests in the possibility of
reverter after the determinable fee are transferred or reserved to the owners of the
various units in proportion to the interest of each in the common areas." Gregory,
The California Condominium Bill, 14 HASTINGS L.J. 189, 192 (1962-1963). See also
Eagen, Title Insurance for Condominiums, 14 HASTINGS L.J. 210, 216-17 (1962-1963) ;
Comment, Community Apartments: Condominium or Stock Cooperative?, 50 CALIF. L.
REv. 299, 302 (1962).
105. ILL. REv. STAT. § 30-315 (Smith-Hurd 1966 Supp.).
106. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-1228 (Burns 1966 Supp.); N.Y. REAL PRoP-
ERTY LAW §§ 339-t, -cc (McKinney 1966 Supp.).
107. PRESTON, ESTATES 479-80 (2d ed. 1820).
108. The fee simple determinable and fee simple subject to condition subsequent
are fee estates even though they will terminate on the occurrence or nonoccurrence of
an event or the termination of a condition. See 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY §§ 2.6,
2.7 (Casner ed. 1954).
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a fee although it will terminate when support is lost. The destruction
or deterioration of support is an objective event, external to the will of
the owner of the possibility of reverter. In contrast, the event that ter-
minates the fee in severalty in a condominium apartment and causes title
to the whole condominium land to vest in all the owners as tenants in
common is a subjective event: an expression of will by the owners, who
also own the possibilities of reverter. The question is whether the con-
dominium estate can have the characteristics of a fee yet be terminable
in this fashion.
For several reasons, it is not inconsistent to treat the condominium
estate as a fee and to treat the fee in severalty in a condominium apart-
ment as terminable by the project tenants. First, while the event that
terminates the fees in apartments is a subjective act, it has an objective
precondition. Since the owners of the fees in apartments are the owners
in common of the possibilities of reverter and since each owner's share in
the tenancy in common is proportionate to the value of his apartment," 9
it is unlikely that a sufficient majority would agree to terminate the
regime unless the land had become substantially less valuable under con-
dominium regime than it would be if the regime were terminated. Ordi-
narily, the owners of a condominium project would favor termination
of the regime only if : 1) there were sufficient economic inducement for
them to give up their residences when they would not otherwise do so, or
2) there were independent reasons for selling their estates and each owner
would receive a better price for his interest in the land after termination
than for his apartment under condominium regime. The continuation of
the condominium might be uneconomical because the building is partially
or wholly destroyed, deteriorated, or obsolete, or because changing land
use patterns make the land more valuable for other uses. The condition
of the building and the character of the neighborhood are objective cir-
cumstances largely beyond the control of the project owners. Therefore,
capricious termination of the project is only remotely probable.
Second, termination of the condominium regime does not terminate
the owner's estate; it merely alters it, albeit drastically. Because of the
character of condominium, the termination of the fees in apartments in-
creases the amount of land owned in common, and if the economic pre-
condition of termination is met, termination increases the value of each
owner's estate. The possibility that the fee in severalty in an apartment
will be merged in the fee in common detracts from the owner's dominion
109. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. § 30-304(c) (Smith-Hurd 1966 Supp.); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 56-1207(a) (Burns 1966 Supp.) ; N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 339-i(1) (Mc-
Kinney 1966 Supp.).
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over the fee in severalty, but it can be compared with the possibility that
a fee in common will be converted to a fee in severalty or to personalty
by a decree of partition. Termination of the condominium regime is the
reverse of partition; yet they are similar. Both alter the form of pos-
session for the purpose of reconciling conflicting or potentially conflict-
ing interests. Termination of the condominium subdivision need not be
considered inconsistent with fee ownership in severalty of space merely
because exclusive possession is -replaced by unity of possession.
Third, accepting the social desirability and attraction of fee owner-
ship, condominium appears to be the most workable form of property
ownership for land-scarce urban areas. It reconciles, better than leasing
or cooperative ownership, the desire for permanent, independent, and
secure possessory estates with the necessity for flexibility in the use of
land.1 ' Because of the practical and legal interdependence of condo-
minium fees, each owner has a unique control over the actions of all
other owners under the same regime. Unless the law permits termination
of the regime when the necessity exists, condominium will become a trap
for the buyer and an impediment to the efficient use of land.
Thw Problem of Location
The prevailing concept of the condominium fee is that the fee in
severalty is permanently fixed in a defined unit of space."' According
to several writers, after the destruction of the condominium building each
owner owns in severalty the block of space previously occupied by his
apartment, and upon reconstruction of the building each apartment must
occupy the same block of space it occupied before destruction."' This
means that the basic design of the rebuilt structure would have to be
identical to that of the destroyed structure. Confining the owners to the
plans of the destroyed building would be technologically, economically,
and esthetically undesirable, depending on the amount of change in tech-
nology and design since the construction of the original building. Dupli-
cation would probably increase the cost of design and construction, and
110. See Comment, Community Apartments: Condominium or Stock Cooperative?,
50 CALIF. L. Ruv. 299 (1962).
111. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 56-1202(a), -1205 (Burns 1966 Supp.); N.J.S.A.
46:8A-2(a) (Cum. Supp. 1966); TEx. Ruv. STAT. tit. 31, art. 1301(a), § 2(e) (Cum.
Supp. 1966).
112. One leading authority takes this rigid view: "If the project is rebuilt, the
rebuilt apartments should fall within the airspace occupied by the original apartments
and the owner of each parcel of airspace should accede to title to the reconstructed apart-
ment which falls within it." Gregory, The California Condomninium Bill, 14 HASTINGS
L.j. 189, 192 (1962-1963). And see Beresford, Condominium in Michigan, 43 MIcH.
S.B.J. 13, 18 (1965) ; Cribbet, Condomi;iuin-Home Ownership for Megalopolis?, 61
MIcH. L. Pv. 1207, 1228 (1963).
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the duplicate building would probably be less valuable than an equally ex-
pensive building of modem design. Most owners would probably oppose
reconstruction, and the condominium would probably be terminated. In
addition, adherence to this rigid concept of the condominium fee's loca-
tion might present a multitude of encroachment problems, since the du-
plication of the destroyed building could seldom be perfect.
Besides being undesirable, the rigid concept of the condominium
fee's location is unnecessary. The obvious but unstated rationale for re-
lating property ownership to fixed and defined tracts of land are two.
First, the location, composition, and configuration of any unit of the
earth is unique, and therefore any unit has peculiar value in terms of eco-
nomics, esthetics, and convenience. Property rights in the earth would
be of questionable value if the land to which they relate could be changed.
Second, relating estates and lesser property interests permanently to a
defined tract of land is necessary to minimize conflict between property
rights and to maximize the enjoyment of those rights.
The space occupied by a condominium apartment and owned in sev-
eralty is significantly less unique than a traditional tract of land which
includes the surface. The gaseous matter which occupies the space is
transient and the same as that which exists at the same altitude in the
vicinity. The position of the space in relation to the surface of the earth
is unique, but the principal character of the space occupied by a condo-
minium apartment is imposed on it by the portions of the building that
enclose it. After the building is destroyed only the positional uniqueness
remains, and space of approximately the same altitude is interchangeable
within limits. In contrast to a fee in a unit of earth, a fee in a unit of
superjacent space is not significantly increased, diminished, or changed
by shifting it to a different unit of space.
The condominium fee need not be permanently fixed in a particular
unit of space to permit the owner to enjoy his estate and to minimize
conflict with other property interests. During the time that each con-
dominium fee is fixed in an apartment in an existing building, either the
original or a replacement, the area in which each owner may exercise
exclusive dominion is delimited. After the building is destroyed there is
little opportunity for conflict since the space once occupied by apartments
cannot be appropriated or used until the owners erect a new building.
The building that permits the appropriation of the space also divides it
into individual apartments.
There is therefore no logical reason for the rigid concept that the
fee in a condominium apartment is permanently fixed in a unit of space.
Since space is interchangeable within limits, the condominium owner's
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estate is not significantly changed because the space occupied by his
apartment in a new building is not the same space occupied by his apart-
ment in a destroyed building, provided the size, quality, and location of
his new apartment approximate those of his original apartment. There
is reason for permitting the owners of a condominium to apply the latest
technology and architecture in replacing a destroyed building; there is no
reason for requiring them to adhere to the plan of the original building.
A better concept of the condominium fee's location is that the fee
in severalty in an apartment terminates when the condominium building
is destroyed and revives in the space occupied by a new apartment if the
building is reconstructed in condominium regime, and that the condo-
minium estate includes the right to have the fee in severalty relocated if
the condominium is continued. So long as a building exists, its apart-
ments are owned in fee simple determinable. Destruction of the build-
ing terminates the fees in apartments and terminates the subdivision that
the building imposed on the condominium land. It does not terminate
the condominium regime; the land is owned in common, and partition
does not lie. The regime is terminated only if the requisite vote to re-
construct the building is not obtained within a specified period of time.
If a new building is built, it establishes a new subdivision of the land and
relocates the destroyed fees. It seems obvious that each owner has a
right to an apartment of approximately the same size and location as the
one destroyed. Subject to these rights, the owners are free to adopt the
location, design, and architecture they collectively desire for the new
structure, unencumbered by the subdivision imposed by the destroyed
building. Attributing legal significance to the building as establishing
the plan of subdivision not only permits flexibility in design of the new
building, but also avoids a host of technical and legal problems that
would arise if duplication of the original building were necessary.
The essence of this flexible concept of the condominium fee's loca-
tion is the distinction between the condominium regime and the condo-
minium subdivision. Virtually all writers assume that they are insepar-
able: that the condominium regime exists only so long as the land is sub-
divided into fees in severalty." 3  Some of the enabling statutes seem to
compel this assumption. 14 The practical effect of treating the regime
and the subdivision as inseparable is that if the owners wish to vary the
design of the original condominium building in replacing it, they must
113. Ibid. This assumption must underlie the conclusion that if the destroyed build-
ing is replaced, each fee in severalty must occupy the same space it did before destruc-
tion.
114. E.g., ILL. Ray. STAT. § 30-313 (Smith-Hurd 1966 Supp.); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
448.130 (Cum_ Supp. 1966).
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terminate the condominium regime, construct a new building as tenants
in common, and, as tenants in common, convey to themselves as indi-
viduals fees in severalty in the new apartments. But termination of the
condominium regime removes the authority that the body of condomin-
ium owners, as a legal entity, has over the individual owners, including
its power to assess a dissenting owner for his share of the cost of rebuild-
ing and its immunity from partition at the behest of less than a specified
percentage of the owners.115 The owners who wish to rebuild with a
new design must therefore acquire the land after partition and adopt an
appropriate form of association to erect a new building. By distinguish-
ing between the regime and the subdivision the flexible concept permits
the owners to adopt a new design without these inconveniences.
There is an obvious legal difference in the condominium owner's
status under the two concepts; under the rigid concept his ownership in
severalty of a defined block of airspace survives the destruction of the
condominium building, and under the flexible concept it does not. The
significance of this distinction is not great in comparison with the limita-
tions that both concepts place on the owner's dominion over his land.
Under both concepts his ownership in severalty can be terminated by a
majority vote of the owners. Under both concepts he cannot obtain par-
tition unless a specified percentage of the owners agree to terminate. Un-
der both concepts he can be compelled to bear the cost of reconstruction
unless he finds a willing buyer. 6 Under the flexible concept he does
not have the right to occupy the same space -on reconstruction, but he
surely has rights to receive space and rooms of comparable quality.
The true distinction in the owner's status is practical, not legal. Un-
der the flexible concept it is more probable that destroyed condominium
structures will be rebuilt, and therefore less probable that after the build-
ing's destruction the condominium owner can sell his interest and use the
proceeds to buy a new residence. Under the rigid concept the owner who
wants to sell has leverage over the majority who want to rebuild: the
115. The enabling statutes provide for compulsory reconstruction if a specified
majority of the owners favor it, or if destruction is less than complete, see, e.g., IND.
ANN. STAT. §§ 56-1219, -1220 (Burns 1966 Supp.); N.J.S.A. 46:8A-24 (Cum. Supp.
1966); N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 339-cc (McKinney 1966 Supp.), but they frequently
require a super-majority vote to compel reconstruction, see, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-
1219 (Burns 1966 Supp.); N.J.S.A. 46:8A-24 (Cum. Supp. 1966), and disallow compul-
sory reconstruction where the building is substantially destroyed, see, e.g., IND. ANN.
STAT. § 56-1219 (Burns 1966 Supp.); N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 339-cc (McKinney
1966 Supp.) ; PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 68, § 700.802 (1965), or where insurance proceeds are
inadequate for reconstruction, see, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 1355 (f) (Cum. Supp. 1966).
116. Contrast the situation of the condominium owner with that of the tenant in
common, who cannot be compelled to contribute to the cost of repairs and improvements
in the absence of a contract. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.18 (Casner ed. 1954).
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majority cannot change the subdivision unless they release the dissenter
from the authority of the condominium regime, and they are unlikely to
perpetuate the regime unless they can adopt a new subdivision. Under
both concepts the disadvantages of being held in the regime after destruc-
tion of the building are considerable. The owner must either sell his
estate or find other housing until a new building is completed. If he
finds a willing buyer for his prospective condominium residence, the pro-
ceeds of sale will probably be less than they would be if the regime were
terminated and the entire condominium tract were sold. The inconveni-
ence and expense of using temporary quarters and waiting for comple-
tion of a new building are obvious.
Realistically, the disadvantages of continuing the condominium re-
gime after the building is destroyed are sufficiently great that continua-
tion of the regime is unlikely. The owners of residential condominiums
will probably be able to find new residences and will probably be unwill-
ing to undertake the construction of a new building. However, the
owners of commercial condominiums might want to rebuild on the sites
occupied by the destroyed buildings." Particularly in urban areas, the
cost of acquiring new quarters might be greater than the cost of con-
structing new buildings on the sites of destroyed condominiums. Also,
it might be necessary to keep businesses in the same location to preserve
local markets. If the interests of dissenting owners can be protected, the
courts should not construe condominium enabling statutes in a manner
that discourages rebuilding of destroyed condominium buildings.
The superiority of the flexible concept over the rigid concept is ap-
parent where a condominium building is destroyed by forces beyond the
control of the owners. A more serious question is whether the owners
may, without terminating the regime, voluntarily terminate the subdivi-
sion, remove the building that imposed that subdivision, and establish a
new subdivision by constructing a building of different design. If they
may do so by less than unanimous consent, a dissenting owner's estate
could be shifted from one unique unit of space to another unique unit of
space. This would violate one of the rationale for permanently relating
an estate to a defined unit of land. The dissenter's unique land could be
taken from him, and he could be deprived of the effective possession of
his estate. Furthermore, if the subdivision may be voluntarily termi-
nated by less than unanimous consent, the dissenting owner could be as-
sessed for the cost of constructing a new building.
117. The Indiana Horizontal Property Act expressly contemplates the commercial
or industrial condominium and the ownership of condominium "apartments" by firms,
corporations, and partnerships. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 56-1202(a), (b) (Burns 1966
Supp.).
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As already noted, under condominium enabling statutes a condo-
minium owner can be deprived of the exclusive possession of his apart-
ment without his consent by the majority's termination of the regime,
and, where the condominium building has been damaged or destroyed, an
owner can be compelled to pay a proportionate share of the cost of repair
or reconstruction. The former qualification of the owner's fee estate is
founded in the necessity for an effective means of converting the condo-
minium land to other uses in response to changing socio-economic condi-
tions. The latter qualification of his fee estate is founded in the neces-
sity for an effective means of restoring possession of the condominium
estates after destruction of the condominium building. Voluntary ter-
mination of the subdivision, which would necessarily be a prelude to new
construction,118 would combine these two qualifications in circumstances
where neither was justified. By terminating the regime it is possible to
release the land for a new use or new construction without compelling
dissenting owners to finance the new construction. After termination
the majority can purchase the land at the partition sale. Since the owners
have possession of their apartments in the existing building there is no
necessity for compelling them to finance a new building.
Voluntary termination of the condominium subdivision by less than
unanimous consent can only be justified by the argument that it is neces-
sary to permit that modernization without which condominium owner-
ship will be impermanent and unattractive. However, the possibility that
dissenters from a plan of replacement will be forced out of their apart-
ments and compelled to finance the construction of new ones makes con-
dominium less attractive than it would otherwise be. Termination of the
regime is a sufficient protection of the majority interest. A majority
favoring replacement of the existing building can terminate the regime,
re-acquire the land at the partition sale, attract new buyers, and establish
a new regime, at the additional cost of buying out the dissenters. Alter-
natively, voluntary termination of the subdivision might be permitted,
with "appraisal" rights in the dissenters.
The conclusion that voluntary termination of the condominium sub-
division is objectionable does not require rejection of the flexible con-
cept of the condominium fee's location. The distinction between the re-
gime and the subdivision is a sensible and necessary one. Termination
of the subdivision should be limited to automatic termination when the
regime is terminated or when the building is destroyed by forces beyond
the owners' control.
118. If the majority did not plan to replace the existing building, they would ter-
minate the regime.
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Adoption of the flexible concept may require the amendment of
some of the enabling acts to draw, or to permit the courts to draw, the
distinction between condominium regime and condominium subdivi-
sion.1 Provisions should also be made for preserving continuity of title
in the recording system.' Non-possessory interests having their origin
in the peculiar physical relation between the encumbered tenement and
the benefitted tenement will necessarily terminate with the subdivision in
which they existed and will not revive in a new subdivision unless the
peculiar physical relation of the tenements is re-created. Included in this
class are most easements and covenants. Other non-possessory interests,
(including mortgages, liens, and other security interests) that do not
arise from the peculiar physical relation of tenements will not terminate
with the subdivision but will continue to encumber the condominium
estate while the land is not subdivided into fees in severalty and after a
new subdivision is made. The device selected to preserve the continuity
of titles should: 1) indicate the termination of the old subdivision and
the establishment of a new one, 2) identify each condominium estate
with its apartment in the old and new subdivisions, and 3) fix responsi-
bility for the filing of the necessary documents.
Adoption of the flexible concept will also require the amendment of
condominium declarations and deeds to distinguish between the regime
and the subdivision and to provide for the establishment of a new sub-
division after the building is destroyed. The procedures for establish-
ment of a new subdivision must necessarily be complex. They should
expedite the selection of a new design and the erection of a new building
but should also protect the rights of individual owners. If the procedure
is too expeditious, the hazard of litigation by disappointed owners will be
great, but if the procedure is too favorable to the individual, effective
decision-making will be impossible. The drafting and implementation of
provisions for the establishment of a new subdivision may be the most
difficult problem in creating and operating condominiums.
Conclusion
By adopting condominium enabling statutes state legislatures have
119. Some of the statutes could be construed as permitting the adoption of a new
subdivision on reconstruction. The Indiana Horizontal Property Act requires that floor
plans be filed when the declaration submitting the land to condominium regime is filed,
IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-1213 (Burns 1966 Supp.), and provides for amendment of the
declaration, IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-1212(i) (Burns 1966 Supp.). There is no express pro-
vision for amendment of the floor plans.
120. The Indiana Horizontal Property Act contains detailed provisions for record-
ing condominium deeds and any other instruments affecting the condominium or an
apartment. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 56-1213 to -1215 (Burns 1966 Supp.).
254 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
recognized a new estate unknown to the common law. The progress of
civilization and the depletion of essential natural resources require novel
responses from the law which necessarily introduce new complexities in-
to the law. The condominium estate is a workable legislative response
to the demands of modem urban life. The courts should not nullify that
response by adding to the inherent complexities of condominium the
rigidities attached to the ancient common law estates. If condominium
is to be an effective form of property ownership, judicial liberality and
innovation must make it so.
